

Claremont Graduate University
Department of Politics and Policy
SPE351 Comparative Political Institutions
Fall 2016

Contact Information

Course Instructor: Melissa Rogers

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Office Hours: Tuesday 2-4pm or by appointment

Course Schedule

Meeting day, time: Wednesday 4-7pm

Course Location: Burkle 24

Course Description

The study of political institutions dominates the field of comparative politics. In this course, we will examine both the validity and foundations of the study of political institutions as well as look in-depth at the institutions of modern government. This course is a core requirement for the comparative politics concentration. It provides foundational concepts and methods of analysis necessary for the regional and elective comparative politics courses.

Moreover, this class is a useful elective course for concentrations in American politics and International Relations. American political institutions are used as a basis for understanding the functioning of institutions in other countries. Accordingly, students learn about American institutions and the effect of those institutions that is not visible outside of a comparative perspective. In international relations, the domestic politics of the world's governments are crucial to understanding how they behave in the international arena. This course provides a strong foundation for analyzing the behavior and motivations of governments.

Specifically, this course examines the diversity and causal effects of the institutions of democracy across the world. These include executives, legislatures, bureaucracies, courts, electoral rules, and party systems. The methods of analysis are diverse; we examine cross-national statistical research, case studies, formal models, and more. Students also learn the broad concepts of institutions and institutional analysis that can be applied across the wide variety of democracies and autocracies alike.

Democracy is most often associated with the institution of elections. We will follow global elections as part of the course, both to understand the institutional dynamics within the voting countries, as well as the political situations that interact with those dynamics.

Background Preparations (Prerequisites)

Core courses in Comparative Politics (PP350, PP352) are helpful but not required for the course. The literature covered often includes advanced statistical and formal methods. Students are not expected to understand the complexities of these methods but to focus on the theoretical arguments and policy conclusions in these readings.

Student Learning Outcomes:

By the end of this course, students will be able to:

1. Evaluate the purposes and functioning of political institutions
2. Integrate understanding of political institutions with other approaches in political science
3. Discuss the most important institutional literature in comparative politics
4. Analyze the role of institutions in political and economic outcomes
5. Understand the debates in institutional design and adoption

Texts and Journal References

Required: nearly all readings are available Canvas or Google books. Some students like to purchase the following books, but these can also be found on Google Books or checked out from the Honnold/Mudd Library.

Claucus, Richard and Melody Ellis Valdini. *The Character of Democracy: How Institutions Shape Politics*. Oxford University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael E Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Vol. 3: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Course Requirements & Assignments:

Students are required to complete a midterm exam, final exam, and 2 response papers (3-4 pages long). The midterm and final exams will take place in class and will mimic the structure of the Ph. D. qualifying exams. Students may choose any 2 weeks during the semester for their response papers. Participation is also crucial to your grade in the course. It will be worth 10% of the total course grade and will include discussion questions. These discussion questions are due the weeks that you write a response paper (determined in a sign-up sheet in weeks 1 and 2.)

No late exams will be accepted unless special arrangements are made via a request, in writing, to me at least 2 weeks prior to the exam. Late papers will be deducted a 10 points per day for each day late and will not be accepted after the 4th day.

Assignment Schedule:

Response Papers- 2 total, timing determined by students

Midterm Exam- October 12th

Final Exam- December 14th

Grade Breakdown:

Midterm: 30%

Final Exam: 35%

Response Papers (2): 25%

Participation: 10%

Grading Description: Written Assignments

Assignments are graded based on their academic rigor. In particular, I focus on whether the student has made an argument and how that argument is supported by logic and by the cited literature. I do not want students simply to summarize the literature but rather to fit literature into a coherent argument that both demonstrates understanding of the literature and ability to develop and defend an original argument. I use the following grading rubric, developed by the Association of American Universities to evaluate papers. The numbers at the top of the grid reflect the point value for each element of the paper.

Grading Description: Participation

Students should be prepared to participate in every class session. I will document the frequency of participation by individual students in each class period. Participation can include participation in class discussions, presentation of discussion questions, and background research on current elections. Students will present discussion questions the weeks that they write response papers. This gives students a clear opportunity to participate in the course. This semester we will follow global elections. Each student will be assigned an election to follow and report findings back to the course as a whole. I understand that different students have different ways of participating. If students are uncomfortable speaking often in class, they can participate by uploading current event articles to Sakai and presenting additional discussion questions.

Attendance

Students are expected to attend all classes. Students who are unable to attend class must seek permission for an excused absence from the course director or teaching assistant. Unapproved absences or late attendance for three or more classes may result in a lower grade or an “incomplete” for the course. If a student has to miss a class, he or she should arrange to get notes from a fellow student and is strongly encouraged to meet with the teaching assistant to obtain the missed material. Missed extra-credit quizzes and papers will not be available for re-taking.

Scientific and Professional Ethics

The work you do in this course must be your own. Feel free to build on, react to, criticize, and analyze the ideas of others but, when you do, make it known whose ideas you are working with. You must explicitly acknowledge when your work builds on someone else's ideas, including ideas of classmates, professors, and authors you read. If you ever have questions about drawing the line between others' work and your own, ask the course professor who will give you guidance. Exams must be completed independently. Any collaboration on answers to exams, unless expressly permitted, may result in an automatic failing grade and possible expulsion from the Program. Any plagiarism will result in a failing grade and possible disciplinary action by CGU.

Grading

<i>Letter Grade</i>	<i>Grade Point</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Learning Outcome</i>
<i>A</i>	<i>4.0</i>	<i>Complete mastery of course material and additional insight beyond course material</i>	<i>Insightful</i>
<i>B</i>	<i>3.0</i>	<i>Complete mastery of course material</i>	<i>Proficient</i>
<i>C</i>	<i>2.0</i>	<i>Gaps in mastery of course material; not at level expected by the program</i>	<i>Developing</i>
<i>U</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>Unsatisfactory</i>	<i>Ineffective</i>

Instructor Feedback and Communication

The best way to get in touch with me is by email at Melissa.rogers@cgu.edu. I will respond to email within two business days. If you have not heard from me in two days, please contact me again and I will respond promptly.

Expectations and Logistics

All readings that can be uploaded to Sakai are available through this site. If you choose to contact me through Sakai, please check the box that indicates “send email” so that I am sure to see the message. I will distribute and receive assignments through Sakai unless special arrangements are needed. All assignments should be submitted in .doc or .pdf format on Sakai. Response papers should be uploaded to the Sakai “dropbox.” Graded assignments will be returned in class the week after they were submitted.

Accommodations for Students with Disabilities

CGU is committed to offering auxiliary aids and services to students with verifiable disabilities, in compliance with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. To ensure that their individual needs are addressed, students with special needs are encouraged to contact the Dean of Students Office as early as possible. Additional resources can be found on the linked page (<http://www.cgu.edu/pages/1154.asp>).

Weekly Readings

Week 1 (8/31/16): NO CLASS

Week 2 (9/7/16): Introduction, Institutions and the Origin of the State

- Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1, 2 (April 1989), 131-147.
- Adam Przeworski, "Institutions Matter?" *Government and Opposition* 39, 2004: 527-540.
- David Stasavage. Cities, constitutions, and sovereign borrowing in Europe, 1274-1785. *International Organization*, 61:489–525, Summer 2007
- Roger B. Myerson. The autocrat's credibility problem and foundations of the constitutional state. *The American Political Science Review*, 102(1):125–139, February 2008
- Ostrom, Elinor. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997." *American political science review* 92, no. 01 (1998): 1-22.
- Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer, "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," *American Economic Review*, 94: 1190-1212.
- Minhas, Ulfedler, and Ward. "Mining texts to efficiently generate global data on political regime types." *Research and Politics*. July-September 2015: 1-8.

Week 3 (9/14/16): Democracy vs. Autocracy

- Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, chs. 1 and 2.
- Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, Chs. 1-3.
- Philip Keefer, "What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development -- and Vice Versa?," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 7: 247-272.
- Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review* 87(3), September 1993: 567-576.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Diverson, and Alastair Smith. "Political Competition and Economic Growth." *Journal of Democracy* 12(1), January 2001.
- Rogers, Melissa Ziegler. "Taxing with Dictators and Democrats: Regime Effects, Transfers and Revenue in Argentina's Provinces." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 6, no. 1 (2014).

Week 4 (9/21/16): Consensual vs. Majoritarian Democracy

- Clucas and Ellis Valdini, Chapters 1-2
- Gerring, John, Strom C Thacker, and Carola Moreno. "Centripetal Democratic Governance: A Theory and Global Inquiry." *American Political Science Review* 99, no. 04 (2005): 567-81.

- John Ferejohn. "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control." *Public Choice* 30, Fall 1986: 5-25.
- James Fearon. "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance." In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, ch. 1
- Richard Rose, The End of Consensus in Austria and Switzerland. *Journal of Democracy* 11, 2 (April 2000), 26-40.

Week 5 (9/28/16): Presidentialism and Executives

- Clucas and Ellis Valdini, Chapter 5
- Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, chs. 1(Linz) and 4 (Stepan and Skach).
- Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 1 and 11.
- Carreras, Miguel. "The Rise of Outsiders in Latin America, 1980–2010 an Institutional Perspective." *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 12 (2012): 1451-82.
- Le Van, A. Carl. "Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa's Uncertain Democracies." *Governance* 24, no. 1 (2011): 31-53.

Podcast: Freakonomics Radio, Episode 254 "Ten Ideas to Make Politics Less Rotten"

Week 6 10/5/16): Parliamentary Democracy

- Gary W. Cox, *The Efficient Secret*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, ch. 6.
- Döring, H., & Manow, P. (2015). Is Proportional Representation More Favourable to the Left? Electoral Rules and Their Impact on Elections, Parliaments and the Formation of Cabinets. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1-16.
- Bäck, H., Debus, M., & Dumont, P. (2011). Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, 50(4), 441-478.
- Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, eds., *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Chapters 3 and 22.

Week 7 (10/12/16): MIDTERM

Week 8 (10/19/16): Electoral Rules

- Clucas and Ellis Valdini, Chapter 3
- Carles Boix, Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. *American Political Science Review* 93, 3 (September 1999), 609-24.

- Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 1-4, 8, and 15.
- Carey, John, and Matthew Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote." *Electoral Studies* 14(4): 417-439.

Week 9 (10/26/16): Parties and Party Systems

- Clucas and Ellis Valdini, Chapter 4
- Wolfgang C. Muller and Kaare Strom, eds., *Policy, Office, or Votes: How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, ch. 1.
- Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 10 and 12.
- Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, ch. 1.
- Kitschelt. 2000. Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Politics. *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (6/7)

Week 10 (11/2/16): Federalism

- Clucas and Ellis Valdini, Chapter 7
- Barry R. Weingast, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 11, 1, 1-31.
- Daniel Treisman, "Political Decentralization and Economic Reform." *American Journal of Political Science* 43, 2 (April 1999), 488-517.
- Samuels, David. 2000. "Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil." *Comparative Politics* 33(1): 1-20.

Week 11 (11/9/16): Veto Players and Policy Outcomes

- Clucas and Ellis Valdini, Chapter 6
- George Tsebelis. *Veto Players*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Chapter 1
- Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins. "The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes." In *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*, edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Matthew Shugart and Stephan Haggard, "Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems." In *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*, edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Andrew MacIntyre, "Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia." *International Organization* 55(1), 2001: 81-122.

Week 12 (11/16/16): Institutions and Redistribution

- Chapter 6 in Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*. MIT Press, 2000
- John C. Roemer. Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: An old argument in new garb. *Journal of Public Economics*, 70:399-424, 1998

- Anivash Dixit and John Londregan. The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. *The Journal of Politics*, 58.4:1132–1155, November 1996
- Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, Roberto Perotti, and Massimo Rostagno. Electoral systems and public spending. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(2):609–657, May 2002
- Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage. (2009). Institutions, partisanship, and inequality in the long run. *World Politics*
- Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnson. The political economy of benefits and costs: A neoclassical approach to distributive politics. *Journal of Political Economy*, 89(4):642–664, August 1981

Week 13 (11/23/16): Rule of Law, Representation and Accountability

- Clucas and Ellis Valdini, Chapter 8
- Maravall, José María and Adam Przeworski (eds.) 2003. *Democracy and the Rule of Law*. Cambridge University Press. Chs 1, 5, 8
- Przeworski, Manin, and Stokes, *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. 1-16, 29-54,
- Stokes, Susan. 2001. *Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1
- Stokes, Susan. 2005. "Perverse Accountability." *American Political Science Review* 99(3).

Week 14 (11/30/16): Bureaucracy

- James E. Rauch and Peter B. Evans. Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries. *Journal of Public Economics*, 75:49-71, 2000
- Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols versus fire alarms. *American Journal of Political Science*, 28(1):165-179, February 1984
- Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin. Dictators and their viziers: Agency problems in dictatorships. December 2004 <http://www.cefir.ru/papers/WP43update.pdf>
- Jakob Svensson. Eight questions about corruption. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19(3):19-42, Summer 2005

Week 15 (12/7/16): Endogenous Institutions

- Rodden, Jonathan. "Endogenous Institutions and Comparative Politics." *Comparative politics: Rationality, culture, and structure*. In Lichbach and Zuckerman. *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. Cambridge University Press (2009).
- Aghion, P., Alesina, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004). Endogenous Political Institutions. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(2).
- Carrubba, Clifford James. "A model of the endogenous development of judicial institutions in federal and international systems." *The Journal of Politics* 71.01 (2009): 55-69.
- Beramendi, Pablo. (2007). Inequality and the territorial fragmentation of solidarity. *International Organization*, 61(4), 783.

Week 16 (12/14/16): FINAL EXAM